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This paper studies the apparent contradiction between two strands of the literature on the effects 
of financial intermediation on economic activity.  On the one hand, the empirical growth 
literature finds a positive effect of financial depth as measured by, for instance, private domestic 
credit and liquid liabilities (e.g., Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000).  On the other hand, the banking 
and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic credit, are among 
the best predictors of crises and their related economic downturns (e.g., Kaminski and Reinhart 
1999).  The paper accounts for these contrasting effects based on the distinction between the 
short- and long-run impacts of financial intermediation.  Working with a panel of cross-country 
and time-series observations, the paper estimates an encompassing model of short- and long-run 
effects using the Pooled Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999).  
The conclusion from this analysis is that a positive long-run relationship between financial 
intermediation and output growth co-exists with a mostly negative short-run relationship.  The 
paper further develops an explanation for these contrasting effects by relating them to recent 
theoretical models, by linking the estimated short-run effects to measures of financial fragility 
(namely, banking crises and financial volatility), and by jointly analyzing the effects of financial 


















































































































FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, FINANCIAL FRAGILITY, AND GROWTH 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper analyzes the apparent contradiction between two strands of the 
literature on the effects of financial intermediation on economic activity.  On the one 
hand, the empirical growth literature finds a positive effect of measures of private 
domestic credit and liquid liabilities on per capita GDP growth (as illustration, see Figure 
1).  This is interpreted as the growth enhancing effect of financial development (e.g., 
King and Levine, 1993; Levine, Loayza, and Beck, 2000).  On the other hand, the 
banking and currency crisis literature finds that monetary aggregates, such as domestic 
credit, are among the best predictors for crises (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Degatriache, 
1998 and 2000; Gourinchas, Landerretche, and Valdés, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999).  Since banking crises usually lead to recessions, an expansion of domestic credit 
would then be associated with growth slowdowns (see Figure 2).   
A similar divide exists at the theoretical level.
1  According to the endogenous 
growth literature, financial deepening leads to a more efficient allocation of savings to 
productive investment projects (see Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Bencivenga and 
Smith, 1991). Conversely, the financial crisis literature points to the destabilizing effect 
of financial liberalization as it leads to an unduly large expansion of credit.  Overlending 
would occur through a combination of channels, including a limited monitoring capacity 
of regulatory agencies, the inability of banks to discriminate good projects during 
investment booms, and the existence of an explicit or implicit insurance against banking 
failures (Schneider and Tornell, 2004; Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee, 2003).  Not 
surprisingly, each strand of the literature has produced its own set of policy implications.  
Thus, researchers that emphasize the findings of the endogenous growth literature 
advocate financial liberalization and deepening (e.g., Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992), 
while those that concentrate on crises caution against “excessive” financial liberalization 
(e.g., Balino and Sundarajan, 1991; Gavin and Hausman, 1995). 
This paper contributes to the debate on the effects of financial deepening from an 
empirical perspective.  First, we want to highlight and illustrate the contrasting effects of   3
financial liberalization and credit expansion on economic activity.  Second, we attempt to 
provide an empirical explanation for these contrasting effects.  In particular, on the one 
hand we relate the positive influence of financial depth on investment and growth to the 
long-run effect of financial liberalization; and, on the other, we describe a link between 
the negative impact of financial volatility and crisis and the short-run effect of 
liberalization. Although it is not our purpose to test competing theories, our empirical 
results provide support to some recent theoretical models predicting that financial 
liberalization can both generate short-run instability and higher long-run growth. 
 The paper is organized as follows.  In section II we examine the output growth 
effects of cyclical and trend changes of financial intermediation.  For this purpose, we 
estimate an encompassing model of short- and long-run effects using a panel of cross-
country and time-series observations.  Our basic econometric technique is the Pooled 
Mean Group estimator developed by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999).  By focusing on 
effects at different time horizons, we set the basis for an explanation of the apparently 
contradictory effects of financial intermediation on economic activity.    In section III, we 
discuss and develop further this explanation.  First, we link our short- and long-run 
results to recent theoretical models on the effects of financial liberalization.  Second, 
since our econometric methodology allows us to estimate country-specific short-run 
effects of financial intermediation on output growth, we analyze their relationship with 
country-specific measures of financial fragility, namely, banking crises and volatility.  
And third, we go back to the classic context of growth regressions and consider whether 
the volatility and crises aspects of financial liberalization are relevant growth 
determinants, along with the usual measures of financial depth.  Section IV concludes. 
 
II. SHORT- AND LONG-RUN GROWTH EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION   
In this section we estimate an empirical model that encompasses the short- and 
long-run growth effects of financial intermediation.  We use the estimation results to 
formulate an empirical explanation of the apparently contradictory effects of financial 
intermediation on economic activity.  This explanation is based on the distinction 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 Except for a few rather recent papers, some of the reviewed below in the paper.   4
between the cycle and trend changes of financial intermediation and their corresponding 
effects on output growth.   
Instead of averaging the data per country to isolate trend effects, we estimate both 
short- and long-run effects using a data-field composed of a relatively large sample of 
countries and annual observations.  Our method can be summarized as a panel error-
correction model, where short- and long-run effects are estimated jointly from a general 
autoregressive distributed-lag (ARDL) model and where short-run effects are allowed to 
vary across countries.    
We propose this panel error-correction method as an alternative to the traditional 
method of time averaging for the following reasons.  First, while averaging clearly 
induces a loss of information, it is not obvious that averaging over fixed-length intervals 
effectively eliminates business-cycle fluctuations.  Second, averaging eliminates 
information that may be used to estimate a more flexible model that allows for some 
parameter heterogeneity across countries.  Third, and most importantly for our purposes, 
averaging hides the dynamic relationship between financial intermediation and economic 
activity, particularly the presence of opposite effects at different time frequencies.
2    
A. Methodology 
Empirical estimation poses two issues.  The first is the need to separate and 
estimate short- and long-run effects without the need to decompose directly trend and 
transitory components of growth, financial intermediation, and the other explanatory 
variables.  We treat this issue below in the context of single-country estimation.  The 
second issue is the likely possibility that the parameters in the relationship between 
financial intermediation and economic activity be different across countries.  It can be 
argued that country heterogeneity is particularly relevant in short-run relationships, given 
that countries are affected by overlending and financial crises to widely different degrees.  
On the other hand, we can expect that long-run relationships would be more 
homogeneous across countries.  We discuss below the issue of heterogeneity in the 
context of multi-country estimation. 
                                                 
2 Similar arguments are made by Attanasio, Scorcu, and Picci (2000) in their cross-country study on the 
dynamic relationship between saving, investment, and growth.   5
Single-country estimation 
The challenge we face is to estimate long- and short-run relationships without 
observing the long- and short-run components of the variables involved.  Over the last 
decade or so, a booming cointegration literature has focused on the estimation of long-run 
relationships among I(1) variables (Johansen 1995, Phillips and Hansen 1990).  From this 
literature, two common misconceptions have been derived.  The first one is that long-run 
relationships exist only in the context of cointegration among integrated variables.  The 
second one is that standard methods of estimation and inference are incorrect.   
A recent literature, represented in Pesaran and Smith (1995), Pesaran (1997) and 
Pesaran and Shin (1999), has argued against both misconceptions.  These authors show 
that simple modifications to standard methods can render consistent and efficient 
estimates of the parameters in a long-run relationship between both integrated and 
stationary variables and that inference on these parameters can be conducted using 
standard tests.  Furthermore, these methods avoid the need for pre-testing and order-of-
integration conformability given that they are valid whether the variables of interest are 
I(0) or I(1).  The main requirements for the validity of this methodology are that, first, 
there exist a long-run relationship among the variables of interest and, second, the 
dynamic specification of the model be sufficiently augmented so that the regressors are 
strictly exogenous and the resulting residual is serially uncorrelated.
3  Pesaran and co-
authors label this the “autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach” to long-run 
modeling.  
In order to comply with the requirements for standard estimation and inference, 
we embed a long-run growth regression equation into an ARDL (p, q) model. In error-
correction form, this can be written as follows: 























where, y is the per capita GDP growth rate,  X  represents a set of growth determinants 
including financial depth and control variables, γ  and δ  are the short-run coefficients 
                                                 
3 It is worth noting that the assumption of a unique long-run relationship underlies implicitly the various 
single-equation based estimators of long-run relationships commonly found in the cointegration literature. 
Without such assumption, these estimators would at best identify some linear combination of all the long-
run relationships present in the data.   6
related to growth and its determinants, β  are the long-run coefficients, ϕ  is the speed of 
adjustment to the long-run relationship, ε     is a time-varying disturbance, and the 
subscripts i and t represent country and time, respectively.  The term in square brackets 
contains the long-run growth regression, which acts as a forcing equilibrium condition: 
() ( )       ) 0 ( ~   e       wher , , 1 0 I X y t i t i t i
i i
t i µ µ β β + + =      (2) 
Multi-country estimation 
The sample we use for estimation is a “data field,” in the sense that it is 
characterized by time-series (T) and cross-section (N) dimensions of roughly similar 
magnitude. In such conditions, there are a number of alternative methods for multi-
country estimation that vary on the extent to which they allow for parameter 
heterogeneity across countries.  At one extreme, the fully heterogeneous-coefficient 
model imposes no cross-country parameter restrictions and can be estimated on a 
country-by-country basis -- provided the time-series dimension of the data is sufficiently 
large.  When, in addition, the cross-country dimension is also large, the mean of long- 
and short-run coefficients across countries can be estimated consistently by the 
unweighted average of the individual country coefficients.  This is the mean group (MG) 
estimator introduced by Pesaran, Smith, and Im (1996).  At the other extreme, the fully 
homogeneous-coefficient model requires that all slope and intercept coefficients be equal 
across countries.  This is the simple pooled estimator. 
In between the two extremes, there are a variety of estimators.  The dynamic fixed 
effects estimator restricts all slope coefficients to be equal across countries but allows for 
different country intercepts.  The pooled mean group (PMG) estimator, introduced by 
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999), restricts the long-run slope coefficients to be the same 
across countries but allows the short-run coefficients (including the speed of adjustment) 
and the regression intercept to be country specific. The PMG estimator also generates 
consistent estimates of the mean of short-run coefficients across countries by taking the 
simple average of individual country coefficients (provided that the cross-sectional 
dimension is large).   
The choice among these estimators faces a general trade-off between consistency 
and efficiency. Estimators that impose cross-country constraints dominate the 
heterogeneous estimators in terms of efficiency if the restrictions are valid. If they are   7
false, however, the restricted estimators are inconsistent. In particular, imposing invalid 
parameter homogeneity in dynamic models typically leads to downward-biased estimates 
of the speed of adjustment (Robertson and Symons 1992, Pesaran and Smith 1995). 
For our purposes, the pooled mean group estimator offers the best available 
compromise in the search for consistency and efficiency.  This estimator is particularly 
useful when the long run is given by conditions expected to be homogeneous across 
countries while the short-run adjustment depends on country characteristics such as 
vulnerability to domestic and external shocks, monetary and fiscal adjustment 
mechanisms, financial-market imperfections, and relative price and wage flexibility.     
Furthermore, the PMG estimator is sufficiently flexible to allow for long-run coefficient 
homogeneity over only a subset of variables and/or countries.  
Therefore, we use the PMG method to estimate a long-run relationship that is 
common across countries (i.,e, β 1 
i
  =  β 1 
j
    for all countries i, j)    while allowing for 
unrestricted country heterogeneity in the adjustment dynamics and fixed effects.  The 
interested reader is referred to Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) where the PMG estimator 
is developed and compared with the MG estimator. Briefly, the PMG estimator proceeds 
as follows.  First, the estimation of the long-run slope coefficients is done jointly across 
countries through a (concentrated) maximum likelihood procedure.  Second, the 
estimation of short-run coefficients (including the speed of adjustment ϕ
i), country-
specific intercepts β 0
i, and country-specific error variances is done on a country-by-
country basis, also through maximum likelihood and using the estimates of the long-run 
slope coefficients previously obtained.
4 
                                                 
4 The comparison of the asymptotic properties of PMG and MG estimates can be put also in terms of the 
general trade-off between consistency and efficiency noted in the text.  If the long-run coefficients are in 
fact equal across countries, then the PMG estimates will be consistent and efficient, whereas the MG 
estimates will only be consistent.  If, on the other hand, the long-run coefficients are not equal across 
countries, then the PMG estimates will be inconsistent, whereas the MG estimator will still provide a 
consistent estimate of the mean of long-run coefficients across countries. The long-run homogeneity 
restrictions can be tested using Hausman or likelihood ratio tests to compare the PMG and MG estimates of 
the long run coefficients. In turn, comparison of the small sample properties of these estimators relies on 
their sensitivity to outliers.  In small samples (low T and N), the MG estimator, being an unweighted 
average, is very sensitive to outlying country estimates (for instance those obtained with small T).  The 
PMG estimator performs better in this regard because it produces estimates that are similar to weighted 
averages of the respective country-specific estimates, where the weights are given according to their 
precision (that is, the inverse of their corresponding variance-covariance matrix).   8
An important assumption for the consistency of the PMG estimates is the 
independence of the regression residuals across countries.  In practice, non-zero error 
covariances usually arise from omitted common factors that influence the countries’ 
ARDL processes.  We attempt to eliminate these common factors and, thus, ensure the 
independence condition by allowing for time-specific effects in the estimated regression; 
this is equivalent to a regression in which each variable enters as deviations with respect 
to the cross-sectional mean in a particular year.  
As indicated in the previous section, for each country the order of the ARDL 
process must be augmented to ensure that the residual of the error-correction model be 
exogenous and serially uncorrelated.  At the same time, with a limited number of time-
series observations, the ARDL order should not be overextended as this imposes 
excessive parameter requirements on the data.  When the main interest is on the long-run 
parameters, the lag order of the ARDL can be selected using some consistent information 
criteria (such as the Schwartz-Bayesian Criterion) on a country-by-country basis.   
However, when there is also interest in analyzing and comparing the short-run 
parameters, it is recommended to impose a common lag structure across countries, in 
accordance to the characteristics of the analytical model to be studied and the limitations 
of the data.  We use the latter approach in this paper’s implementation of the ARDL 
approach. 
B. Data and Results 
The sample consists of 75 countries with annual data during the period 1960-
2000.  See Appendix 1 for the list of countries included in the sample.  Given the 
procedure’s requirements on the time-series dimension of the data, we include only 
countries that have at least 20 consecutive observations.  The dependent variable is the 
growth rate of GDP per capita.  The measure of financial intermediation is private 
domestic credit as ratio to GDP.
5  The control variables are the initial level of GDP per 
capita, government consumption as ratio to GDP, the structure-adjusted volume of trade 
as ratio to GDP, and the inflation rate.  In order to capture proportional effects, all control 
                                                 
5 The other popular measure of financial intermediation is the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP.  As a 
robustness check, we have repeated all empirical exercises presented in the paper substituting liquid 
liabilities for private credit.  Since these results are essentially the same as those using private credit/GDP, 
we have omitted them in this version of the paper but can make them available upon request.    9
variables are specified in natural logs.  See Appendix 2 for definitions and sources of all 
variables used in the paper, and Appendix 3 for their descriptive statistics.  
Table 1 presents the results on specification tests and the estimation of long- and 
short-run parameters linking per capita GDP growth, financial intermediation, and other 
growth determinants.  We emphasize the results obtained using the pooled mean group 
(PMG) estimator, which we prefer given its gains in consistency and efficiency over 
other panel error-correction estimators.  For comparison purposes, we also present the 
results obtained with the mean group (MG) and the dynamic fixed-effects (DFE) 
estimators. 
As outlined in the previous section, the consistency and efficiency of the PMG 
estimates relies on several specification conditions.  The first are that the regression 
residuals be serially uncorrelated and that the explanatory variables can be treated as 
exogenous.  We seek to fulfill these conditions by including in the ARDL model, 3 lags 
of the growth rate, 3 lags of the measure of finance intermediation, and 1 lag of each 
control variable.  We could not expand the lag structure any further because we would 
run into problems of lack of degrees of freedom.  We chose to use a richer (longer) lag 
structure for the dependent variable (growth) and the variable of interest (financial 
intermediation) because our main concern was to characterize their long- and short-run 
relationships.       
The second specification condition is that both country-specific effects and cross-
country common factors be accounted for.  We control for country-specific effects by 
allowing for an intercept for each country, and we attempt to eliminate cross-country 
common factors by demeaning the data using the corresponding cross-sectional means 
for every period (which is algebraically the same as allowing for year-specific intercepts).   
The third condition refers to the existence of a long-run relationship (dynamic 
stability) and requires that the coefficient on the error-correction term be negative and not 
lower than –2 (that is, within the unit circle).  In the second panel of Table 1, we report 
the estimates for the pooled error-correction coefficient and its corresponding standard 
error.  This coefficient falls within the dynamically stable range in the cases of the PMG 
and dynamic fixed effects estimators.  The fact that the pooled error correction coefficient 
falls outside the allowed range in the case of the mean group estimator reveals that for   10
some countries the dynamic stability condition does not hold.  We come back to this issue 
below.    
The fourth condition is that the long-run parameters be the same across countries.  
As explained in the section on econometric methodology, we can test the null hypothesis 
of homogeneity through a Hausman-type test, based on the comparison between the 
Pooled Mean Group and the Mean Group estimators.  In Table 1 we present the Hausman 
test statistic and the corresponding p-values for the coefficients on each of the 
explanatory variables and for all of them jointly.  The homogeneity restriction is not 
rejected jointly for all parameters; it is not rejected for individual parameters either 
except in the case of trade openness.  
 Regarding the estimated parameters, our analysis focuses on those obtained with 
the PMG estimator.  In the long run, the growth rate of GDP per capita is negatively 
related to initial income, the size of government, and the inflation rate, and positively 
related to international trade openness.  These are standard results from the empirical 
growth literature, and it is reassuring that we are able to reproduce them with our 
methodology.   
Most importantly for our purposes, we find that economic growth is positively 
and significantly linked to the measure of financial intermediation in the long run.  This 
effect is also economically significant as the point estimate implies that a 1 percent 
increase in the ratio of private credit to GDP leads to a rise of 0.7 percentage points in the 
growth rate of per capita GDP.   
The short-run coefficients on financial intermediation tell a different story.  As 
explained earlier, short-run coefficients are not restricted to be the same across countries, 
so that we do not have a single pooled estimate for each coefficient.  Nevertheless, we 
can still analyze the average short-run effect by considering the mean of the 
corresponding coefficients across countries.  We find that the short-run average 
relationship between the growth rate of GDP per capita and the measure of financial 
intermediation appears to be strongly negative, with a point estimate several times larger 
than that of the long-run effect of financial intermediation.  Thus, comparing the long- 
and short-run estimates, a first broad conclusion is that the sign of the relationship   11
between economic growth and financial intermediation depends on whether their 
movements are temporary or permanent.   
In the next section we will take advantage of the cross-country variation of short-
run coefficients to draw a connection between the negative effects of financial 
intermediation and the occurrence of financial volatility and crisis.  Before we do that, 
however, we need to make sure that our results are robust to the exclusion of outlying and 
dynamically unstable observations.  In particular, we want to check to what extent the 
long-run coefficients and especially the average of short-run coefficients are sensitive to 
the exclusion of countries whose estimated short-run effects are considerably larger (in 
absolute value) than typical effects in the sample and countries that present error-
correction coefficients that statistically fall outside the dynamic stable range.  We exclude 
the countries whose short-run coefficients fall outside 2 standard deviations from the 
mean; they are Dominican Republic, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Thailand, Turkey, and 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  We also exclude the countries with unstable dynamics; 
they are Senegal, Uganda, and Zambia.   
The results on the restricted sample are presented in Table 2.  They are 
qualitatively similar to those on the full sample.  The signs and statistical significance of 
all long-run and most short-run coefficients remain unchanged.  The Hausman test does 
not reject the joint homogeneity of all long-run parameters; and it does not reject the 
homogeneity of individual long-run coefficients except for that on initial income.     
Moreover, the long- and short-run effects of private credit on growth are not only 
qualitatively but also quantitatively very similar for the restricted and full samples. 
 
III. FINANCIAL  FRAGILITY, ALONGSIDE  FINANCIAL  DEPTH,  IN THE PATH TO 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT   
  By focusing on the effects of financial intermediation at different time horizons, 
the analysis conducted in the previous section helps us set the basis for an explanation of 
the apparently contradictory effects of financial intermediation on economic activity.    In 
this section, we discuss and develop further this explanation.  First, we review a selected 
set of recent theoretical models that examine the evolution of the effects of financial 
liberalization through time.  All of them differentiate between short- and long-run effects   12
on economic growth.  Moreover, they highlight the point that financial liberalization is 
not only associated with financial depth but also to financial fragility (as captured by 
banking crises and financial volatility), and it is this aspect of financial liberalization that 
explain why intermediation may have a negative short-run effect on growth.   Second, we 
consider this possibility by examining connection between country-specific measures of 
financial volatility and crisis and the country-specific short-run effects of financial 
intermediation estimated in the previous section.  Finally, as a further test of the 
relevance of our results, we take the usual approach of empirical growth analysis in order 
to consider whether the volatility and crises aspects of financial liberalization, and not 
only the customary measures of financial depth, are significant determinants of economic 
growth. 
A. Theoretical discussion 
How can we explain the contrast between the short- and long-run effects of 
financial intermediation?  Recent theories on the aftermath of financial liberalization can 
provide some guidance to answer this question.  We do not attempt to tell them apart by 
testing their particular implications; rather, we intend to draw on their similarities to build 
a sensible explanation.  Gaytán and Rancière (2003) develop a model of banking 
development where banks serve the purpose of providing liquidity insurance --which 
avoids the need for costly asset liquidation-- but are subject to confidence crises leading 
to bank runs.  Banks have the option to insure against these crises, but this is costly as it 
entails less money available for investment.  Gaytán and Ranciere find that in emerging 
countries it is optimal for banks to be only partially covered against the risk of bank runs.  
This is so because in these countries the opportunity cost of full insurance, given by the 
marginal rate of return to investment, is too high.  As countries develop and capital 
productivity decreases, it becomes optimal for banks to be fully covered against crises.  
Therefore, the model predicts that in the short run after financial liberalization, there is 
the chance that emerging countries will face financial crises, switch from non-crisis to 
crisis equilibria, and thus experience volatility of credit and low output growth.  In the 
long run, however, financial development would be free from crises and would render 
stable growth.   13
Dell’Arricia and Marquez (2004a, 2004b) view the aftermath of financial 
liberalization as a period marked by excessive lending, as banks’ screening incentives are 
not at par with the rapid growth for credit demand.  In their model, banks’ incentives to 
screen potential borrowers come from adverse selection among banks –banks screen to 
avoid financing firms whose projects have been tested and rejected by other banks.   
When financial markets are liberalized and many new and untested projects request 
funding, banks do not have strong incentives to screen its pool of applicants and rapid 
credit expansion ensues.  In this case the quality of banks’ portfolio is likely to deteriorate 
and over-lending will result in financial fragility.  At the macroeconomic level, as 
negative shocks occur, financial fragility will give way to financial instability and output 
losses.  Over time, however, as most potential borrowers are tested, banks’ screening 
incentives and practices are restored, and lending begins to grow at stable rates.  Then, 
whereas the short run of financial liberalization is marked with financial crisis, volatility, 
and low output growth, in the long run financial liberalization is bound to improve 
economic growth. 
Rajan (1994) develops a similar mechanism that focuses on bankers’ incentives to 
explain financial fragility.  In his model, bank managers tend to hide non-performing 
loans by maintaining liberal credit policies when most borrowers are solvent (“good” 
times).  When the economy is hit by an aggregate shock and the relative ability of 
individual managers becomes less discernible, they have the incentive to tighten credit 
policy.  This procyclical credit practice tends to finance bad projects in good times and 
squeeze credit away from worthy firms in distress times.  The way to solve this 
inefficient credit practice is through proper banking supervision.  However, in the short 
run after financial liberalization, a great need for credit expansion occurs in the face of 
poor development of supervisory capacity.  In this context, cycles of booms and busts in 
credit and output growth are likely to arise, and they are only gradually replaced by stable 
financial depth and output growth as institutional and supervisory capacities develop.         
For Wynne (2002) the fundamental problem underlying financial fragility does 
not reside in banks’ incentives to screen and monitor potential borrowers; rather, the 
problem is that it takes time and effort for firms to build financial reputation and public 
knowledge about the quality of their investment projects.  This is important because of   14
the intrinsic asymmetry of information between potential borrowers and creditors.  Firms 
create “information” capital only gradually through a higher survival rate and wealth 
accumulation.  When financial liberalization occurs and a large cohort of new firms 
enters the market, the absence of information capital leads to high interest rates, a risky 
banks’ loan portfolio, and inevitably credit misallocation.  At the macroeconomic level, 
this may result in banking crises, cycles of credit expansion and contraction, and low 
output growth, particularly if the economy is hit by large shocks.  Overtime, however, 
good firms build information capital, lending rates decrease, and bank’s loan portfolios 
become safer.  At the aggregate level in the long run, proper credit allocation results in 
higher and more stable productivity growth.  
All these models predict a positive long-run relationship between financial 
intermediation and economic growth.  They also predict that in the short run this 
relationship may be negative and explain through what channels this might occur.  What 
these explanations have in common is that they all link the potential negative short-run 
impact of financial intermediation with the presence of financial volatility and the 
likelihood of banking crises.  Given that our panel data methodology allows us to recover 
country-specific short-run coefficients, we can analyze their connection with financial 
volatility and crises, and to this we turn next.    
B. Analysis of Short-Run Coefficients 
We consider the question of whether the negative short-run relationship between 
growth and financial intermediation can be linked to the occurrence of systemic banking 
crisis and financial volatility.  We quantify this short-run relationship by the short-run 
coefficients on financial intermediation estimated previously for each country in the 
sample.  As a proxy for financial crises, we use the number of years in the period 1960-
2000 that the country has experienced systemic banking crises, according to Caprio and 
Klingbiel (2003).  We measure financial volatility as the standard deviation of the growth 
rate of the private credit to GDP ratio over the period 1960-2000.   
Table 3 reports the simple and rank correlation coefficients  --along with the 
corresponding p-values-- between the short-run coefficients and the measures of financial 
crisis and financial volatility.  We present statistics corresponding to both the full and 
restricted samples.  Not surprisingly, the correlation between crisis and volatility is   15
positive and significant, with values between 0.35 and 0.40.  This is large enough to 
reveal a meaningful connection but sufficiently small to indicate that each variable 
contains independently relevant information.  Most importantly, both financial crisis and 
volatility have a negative and significant correlation (close to -0.30) with the estimated 
short-run coefficients; that is, larger volatility or higher frequency of crises are related to 
more negative short-run impacts of financial intermediation on output growth. 
Another approach to examine this connection is by dividing the sample of 
countries according to criteria given by financial crisis and volatility and then comparing 
the corresponding group means of short-run coefficients.  Regarding financial crises, we 
divide the sample, first, according to whether countries had or not any crises during the 
40 year period (about 60% had at least one year of crisis), and, second, according to 
whether they are above or below the median number of crises.  Regarding financial 
volatility, we divide the sample using as thresholds, first, the 75
th percentile of volatility 
and, second, its median value.   
Table 4 presents the tests of the difference in short-run coefficient means for the 
various ways of grouping countries.  We do so for both the full and restricted samples.  
Countries that experienced financial crises in the last 40 years exhibit an average short-
run impact of financial intermediation on output growth that is significantly more 
negative than the average of countries that did not have any crisis.  In fact, for the non-
crisis countries, the average short-run impact of intermediation on growth is statistically 
zero.  A similar result is obtained when we divide the sample according to the median 
frequency of crises: high-crisis countries show significantly more negative short-run 
impacts than low-crisis countries, and for the latter this impact is indistinguishable from 
zero.  Concerning financial volatility, when we divide the sample using its 75
th percentile 
as threshold, we find that the group of high financial volatility has an average short-run 
effect that is significantly more negative than the group of low and medium volatility.  
The results are similar when we use the median volatility as threshold, but in this case the 
difference in the average short-run coefficients between the two groups is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
Figure 3 (a) presents the (smoothed) frequency distributions of short-run 
coefficients for the groups of crisis and non-crisis countries.  Figure 3 (b) does the same   16
for the groups of high-volatility and medium-to-low-volatility countries (using the 75
th 
percentile as threshold).  In both cases we consider only the restricted sample of countries 
(that is, without outliers and dynamically unstable observations).  The distributions 
appear to be basically symmetrical.  We can see that the groups of crisis and high-
volatility countries not only have more negative average short-run coefficients but also 
have more dispersed distributions, with fatter tails particularly towards the negative 
portion of the spectrum.         
C. Classical Growth Regressions: The role of financial volatility and crisis 
So far our analysis has used a novel empirical estimator to distinguish between 
short- and long-run effects of financial intermediation on economic growth.  This 
methodology uses the time-series dimension of the data at least as intensively as the 
cross-country dimension.  It represents a departure from the typical empirical growth 
literature in which high-frequency movements in the data are averaged out prior to 
estimation.  Typical panel-data growth studies work with country data averaged for 
periods of 5 or 10 years and, therefore, are likely to combine short- and long-run effects.  
In previous sections of the paper, we have argued that the contrasting effects of financial 
intermediation come from different aspects associated to the process of financial 
development --financial depth and fragility.  The growth literature has emphasized the 
role of financial depth and found a positive and significant effect on growth (see King 
and Levine 1993 a, b; and Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000).  In order to provide further 
support to the arguments developed in the paper, we would like to use the typical growth-
regression framework to analyze whether financial fragility is also a relevant determinant 
of growth.
6   
  Data and Methodology 
  We work with a pooled (cross-country, time-series) data set consisting of 82 
countries and, for each of them, at most 8 non-overlapping five-year periods over 1960-
2000.  See Appendix 1 for the list of countries in the sample. 
  As is standard in the literature, our growth regression equation is dynamic in the 
sense that it includes the initial level of per capita output as an explanatory variable.  In   17
addition, the regression includes as control variables the average rate of secondary school 
enrollment, the average structure-adjusted ratio of trade volume to GDP, the average ratio 
of government consumption to GDP, and the average inflation rate.  The explanatory 
variables of interest were introduced above.  They are the average ratio of private credit 
to GDP, as measure of financial depth, and the frequency of systemic banking crises and 
the standard deviation of the growth rate of private credit/GDP, as measures of financial 
fragility.  Finally, the regression equation allows for both unobserved time-specific and 
country-specific effects.   
  We use an estimation method that is suited to panel data, deals with a dynamic 
regression specification, controls for unobserved time- and country-specific effects, and 
accounts for some endogeneity in the explanatory variables.  This is the generalized 
method of moments (GMM) for dynamic models of panel data developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995).    
The regression equation to be estimated is the following, 
  ' ) 1 ( , , , , 1 , 1 , , t i i t t i t i t i t i t i t i FF FD X y y y ε η µ γ δ β α + + + + + + − = − − −      
where, y is the logarithm of real per capita output, X is a set of control variables, FD is 
the indicator of financial depth, FF represents the indicator(s) of financial fragility, µ t is a 
time-specific effect, η i is an unobserved country-specific effect, and ε  is the error term. 
The subscripts i,t represent country and time-period, respectively.    
We relax the assumption of strong exogeneity of the explanatory variables by 
allowing them to be correlated with current and previous realizations of the error term ε .  
However, we assume that future realizations of the error term do not affect current values 
of the explanatory variables.  Furthermore, we assume that the error term ε  is serially 
uncorrelated.  We allow the unobserved country-specific effect η i to be correlated with 
the explanatory variables.  However, following a stationarity condition, we assume that 
changes in the explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the country-specific effect.  As 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) show, this set of assumptions 
generates moment conditions that allow estimation of the parameters of interest.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
6 See Hnatkovska and Loayza (2004) for a general treatment of the link between economic growth and 
macroeconomic volatility, whether this comes from financial fragility, external shocks, monetary 
instability, or other sources.   18
instruments corresponding to these moment conditions are appropriately lagged values of 
the levels and differences of the explanatory and dependent variables.  Since typically the 
moment conditions over-identify the regression model, they also allow for specification 
testing through a Sargan-type test. 
Results 
  Table 5 reports the regression estimation results as well as the Sargan and Serial-
correlation specification tests.  These tests indicate that the hypothesis of correct 
identification cannot be rejected, thus supporting the estimation results to which we turn 
next.  The first column presents the results of a typical growth regression.  It confirms the 
negative growth impact of initial GDP per capita (conditional convergence), the size and 
burden of government, and monetary instability through high inflation.  It also shows the 
positive growth effect of education investment, international trade openness, and, most 
importantly for our purposes, financial depth.  The period shifts are also significant and 
indicate that world conditions deteriorated in the last twenty years making it more 
difficult for countries to grow in the 1980s and 1990s than in the previous decades. 
  The second and third columns include, respectively, financial volatility and the 
frequency of systemic banking crises as additional explanatory variables.  The fourth 
column includes both indicators of financial fragility at the same time.  Whether by 
themselves or together, financial volatility and the frequency of banking crises present a 
significantly negative coefficient.  Financial depth maintains its positive and significant 
coefficient in all regressions.  We can get a broad sense of the economic importance of 
these effects by using the point estimate of the regression coefficients to calculate the 
growth impact of a change in our financial measures. An increase of one sample standard 
deviation in financial volatility leads to a decrease of 0.3 percentage points in the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita, and an analogous increase in the frequency of systemic 
banking crises produces a 0.7 percentage point drop in annual growth.  On the other hand, 
an increase in one sample standard deviation of financial depth leads to economic growth 
rising by 0.9 percentage points.  Naturally, these are ceteris paribus calculations, and our 
conjecture is that the total effect of financial liberalization and intermediation may be a 
combination of these effects, with weights for financial depth and financial fragility 
depending on the stage of financial development that the country is undergoing.   19
      
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
  Over the long run, financial development supports and promotes economic 
growth.  However, the path to development is far from smooth; and along the way, 
economic growth can suffer from the financial fragility that characterizes maturing 
systems.  The process of financial development entails a deepening of markets and 
services that channel savings to productive investment and allow risk diversification; 
these positive aspects of financial development lead to higher economic growth in the 
long run.  As economies mature, however, the same process can present weaknesses 
evidenced by systemic banking crises, cycles of booms and busts, and overall financial 
volatility.  Whether intrinsic to the process of development or induced by policy 
mistakes, these elements of financial fragility can hurt economic growth and will do so 
until maturity is reached.        
  Recognizing the possibility of a dual effect of financial intermediation on 
economic growth, this paper estimates an encompassing empirical model of long- and 
short-run effects using a sample of cross-country and time-series observations.   We find 
that a positive long-run relationship between financial intermediation and output growth 
can coexist with a negative short-run relationship, which indeed is the case for the 
average country in the sample.  Since the methodology allows us to obtain the short-run 
effects of financial intermediation on growth country by country, we can attempt to link 
these effects to the aspects of financial liberalization that the literature proposes as 
harmful to growth.  We find that financially fragile countries, namely those that 
experience banking crises or suffer high financial volatility, tend to present significantly 
negative short-run effects of intermediation on growth.  For more stable countries, this 
effect is in average nil.      
  Finally, attempting to relate our results to the empirical growth literature, we go 
back to the classic context of growth regressions using panel data.  We find that the 
volatility and crisis aspects of financial intermediation are relevant growth determinants, 
along with the usual measures of financial depth.  However, whereas financial depth 
leads to higher growth, financial fragility --as captured by financial volatility and banking 
crises-- has negative growth consequences.  The total impact of financial liberalization   20
and intermediation on economic growth may be a combination of these effects, where the 
relative influences of financial depth and financial fragility would depend on each 
country’s stage of financial development.   21
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TABLES 
Table 1.  The Long- and Short-Run Effect of Financial Intermediation on Economic Growth 
Estimators: Pooled mean group, mean group, and dynamic fixed efffects, all controlling for country and time effects
Dynamic specification:ARDL(3,3,1,1,1,1)
Sample: All countries, annual data 1960-2000
   
Pooled Mean Group   Mean Group   Hausman Tests Dynamic Fixed Effect
Variables Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. h-test p-val Coef. St.Er.
Long-Run Coefficients
Financial intermediation 0.708 0.179 0.948 1.226 0.04 0.84 0.121 0.473
Initial GDP per capita -8.609 0.571 -13.803 4.52 1.34 0.25 -3.489 0.488
Government size -5.705 0.463 -9.217 4.122 0.48 0.49 -2.022 0.462
Trade openness 1.059 0.281 5.176 2.199 4.56 0.03 1.504 0.340
Inflation  -5.969 0.684 4.335 5.899 0.08 0.78 -4.979 0.767
Joint Hausman Test: 8.5 0.13
Error Correction Coefficients
Phi -0.973 0.063 -2.36 0.156 -0.943 0.034
Short-Run Coefficients     
∆ Growth (-1) 0.178 0.056 1.003 0.121 0.041 0.027
∆ Growth (-2) 0.02 0.035 0.447 0.07 -0.017 0.020
∆ Financial intemediation  -4.517 1.136 -2.814 2.008 -10.258 2.137
∆ Financial intermediation (-1) -0.591 1.028 -0.087 1.662 4.930 2.328
∆ Financial intermediation (-2) -0.856 1.310 0.486 1.617 -5.570 2.262
∆ Initial GDP per capita -4.954 2.947 -9.019 5.052 -5.142 1.919
∆ Government size -0.08 1.751 3.76 2.288 -2.894 0.738
∆ Trade openness 3.344 2.223 -4.294 3.626 2.127 0.752
∆ Inflation -2.258 1.842 -0.782 5.046 -0.674 0.871
Intercept -1.24 2.273 -10.121 13.104 -0.010 0.007
Sum of Coefficients on Financial Intermediation  
Σ∆ Financial intemediation coeffs. -5.964 2.316 -2.415 4.24
   
No. Countries 75 75 75
No. Observations 2501 2501 2501
Avg. Rbar squared 0.454 0.67 0.484
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Table 2.  The Long- and Short-Run Effects of Financial Intermediation on Economic Growth, Reduced Sample 
Estimators: Pooled mean group, mean group, and dynamic fixed efffects, all controlling for country and time effects
Dynamic specification:ARDL(3,3,1,1,1,1)
Sample: Countries that are not ouliers or dynamically unstable (66 countries), annual data 1960-2000
   
Pooled Mean Group   Mean Group   Hausman Tests Dynamic Fixed Effect
Variables Coef. St.Er. Coef. St.Er. h-test p-val Coef. St.Er.
Long-Run Coefficients
Financial intermediation 0.632 0.259 0.165 1.314 0.06 0.81 0.107 0.260
Initial GDP per capita -5.181 0.513 -13.886 3.893 5.09 0.02 -3.423 0.512
Government size -2.342 0.41 -1.53 4.06 0.04 0.84 -2.022 0.462
Trade openness 2.422 0.188 2.871 3.133 0.03 0.89 1.458 0.352
Inflation  -5.029 0.596 -4.568 5.849 0.01 0.94 -5.162 0.771
Joint Hausman Test: 7.72 0.17
Error Correction Coefficients
Phi -0.901 0.069 -1.867 0.118 -0.916 0.035
Short-Run Coefficients     
∆ Growth (-1) 0.144 0.049 0.739 0.091 0.056 0.028
∆ Growth (-2) 0.001 0.031 0.314 0.053 -0.003 0.021
∆ Financial intemediation  -5.056 1.033 -4.571 1.762 -2.453 0.591
∆ Financial intermediation (-1) -0.113 1.090 -1.027 1.675 -0.079 0.591
∆ Financial intermediation (-2) -0.534 1.029 -0.64 1.434 -0.346 0.594
∆ Initial GDP per capita -6.115 2.613 -7.511 4.192 -4.712 2.007
∆ Government size -6.509 2.171 -7.14 3.525 -3.192 0.751
∆ Trade openness 3.358 2.18 -2.819 2.719 2.660 0.816
∆ Inflation -4.789 1.576 4.752 4.14 -1.873 0.901
Intercept -0.881 1.312 -7.696 10.063 -0.004 0.007
Sum of Coefficients on Financial Intermediation  
Σ∆ Financial intemediation coeffs. -5.702 1.628 -6.238 4.31
 
No. Countries 66 66 66
No. Observations 2206 2206 2206
Avg. Rbar squared 0.449 0.65 0.47
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Table 3.  Short-Run Coefficients on Financial Intermediation,  
Banking Crises, and Financial Volatility
Standard correlation coefficients in upper rigth triangular matrix 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients in lower left triangular matrix 
(a) Sample: All Countries, average 1960-2000







(b) Sample: 66 Countries, average 1960-2000
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Table 4.  Short-Run Effects of Financial Intermediation Depending on Presence of Banking Crises and
(a) No crisis vs. Some crisis
Mean short-run 
coefficients
Std. error N° obs. Mean short-run 
coefficients
Std. error N° obs.
  No crisis -0.199 2.58 30 -1.093 1.77 29
  Some crisis -9.808 3.36 45 -9.315 2.49 37
Test of difference in means:
Ho: mean(no crisis) - mean(some crisis) = diff = 0   vs.  Ha: diff > 0
diff t-value p-value diff t-value p-value
9.609 2.27 0.013 8.222 2.69 0.005
(b) Low crisis vs. High crisis
Mean short-run 
coefficients
Std. error N° obs. Mean short-run 
coefficients
Std. error N° obs.
  Low crisis -0.343 2.33 34 -1.472 1.62 32
  High crisis -10.626 3.64 41 -9.684 2.7 34
Test of difference in means:
                                    Ho: mean(crisis below median) - mean(crisis above median) = diff = 0   vs.  Ha: diff > 0
diff t-value p-value diff t-value p-value
10.283 2.38 0.01 8.211 2.61 0.006
(c) Low and medium financial volatility vs. High financial volatility
Mean short-run 
coefficients
Std. error N° obs. Mean short-run 
coefficients
Std. error N° obs.
  Low and medium volatility -3.064 2.53 56 -4.227 1.91 51
  High volatility -14.515 4.92 19 -10.717 3.16 15
Test of difference in means:
Ho: mean(fin. vol. below 75 percentile) - mean(fin. vol. above 75 percentile) = diff = 0  
vs.  Ha: diff > 0
diff t-value p-value diff t-value p-value
11.451 2.07 0.024 6.49 1.76 0.045
(d) Low financial volatility vs. High financial volatility
Mean short-run 
coefficients
Std. error N° obs. Mean short-run 
coefficients
Std. error N° obs.
  Low volatility -3.933 2.9 37 -3.903 2.41 36
  High volatility -7.943 3.6 38 -7.861 2.23 30
Test of difference in means:
Ho: mean(fin. vol. below median) - mean(fin. vol. above median) = diff = 0 
       vs.  Ha: diff > 0
diff t-value p-value diff t-value p-value
4.009 0.87 0.195 3.958 1.21 0.116
Notes: - Crisis: Number of years when the country experienced a systemic banking crisis during the period 
               1960-2000, from Caprio and Klingbiel (2003)
             - Financial volatility: Standard deviation of the growth rate of private credit/GDP
Source: Authors' calculations
Full sample Restricted sample
Full sample Restricted sample
Full sample
Full sample Restricted sample
Restricted sample  29
Table 5: The growth effect of financial depth, financial volatility, and financial crises  
Dependent Variable: Growth rate of GDP per capita
(Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coefficient)
Period: 1961-2000
Unit of observation: Non-overlapping 5-year averages
Estimation Technique: System GMM
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Financial Depth 0.9738 ** 0.9094 ** 0.9865 ** 1.0014 **
  (private domestic credit/GDP, in logs) 0.0896 0.0943 0.0894 0.0569
Financial Volatility -5.7453 ** -3.7681 **
  (Std. Dev. of growth rate of private domestic credit/GDP) 0.9959 0.9638
Systemic Banking Crises -2.6989 ** -2.6020 **
  (frequency of years under crisis: 0-1) 0.1966 0.2184
Control Variables:
Initial GDP Per Capita -0.1244 * -0.1852 ** -0.2056 ** -0.3452 **
  (in logs) 0.0642 0.0788 0.0721 0.0928
Education 1.6426 ** 1.6419 ** 1.8303 ** 2.0464 **
  (secondary enrollment, in logs) 0.0970 0.1098 0.1288 0.1323
Trade Openness 0.4853 ** 0.3701 ** 0.7358 ** 0.1973 *
  (structure-adjusted trade volume/GDP, in logs) 0.1117 0.1301 0.1200 0.1206
Government Size -1.7347 ** -1.7225 ** -1.9488 ** -1.9708 **
  (government consumption/GDP, in logs) 0.1445 0.1387 0.1785 0.1898
Lack of Price Stability -3.4775 ** -2.4940 ** -1.7811 ** -1.3138 **
  (inflation rate, in log [100+ inf. rate]) 0.2527 0.3582 0.2143 0.3293
Period Shifts
  benchmark for Cols. 4: 71-75: -0.4348 -0.1019 -0.7126 ** -0.4403 **
76-80: -1.2907 ** -0.8449 ** -1.5133 ** -1.2029 **
81-85: -3.3432 ** -2.9626 ** -3.1966 ** -2.9614 **
86-90: -2.5525 ** -2.1066 ** -2.4078 ** -2.1162 **
91-95: -2.9852 ** -2.4348 ** -2.8070 ** -2.5337 **
96-99: -3.1688 ** -2.4931 ** -2.8753 ** -2.5298 **
Intercept 16.4400 ** 12.5041 ** 9.1010 ** 7.2593 **
1.1319 1.6125 1.0434 1.5605
No. Countries / No. Observations 82/545 82/545 82/545 82/545
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)
 (a) Sargan Test: 0.202 0.245 0.263 0.206
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
       Second-Order 0.325 0.336 0.445 0.438
** means significant at 5% and * means significant at 10%
Source: Authors' estimations    30
FIGURES 
Figure 1. Economic Growth and Financial Intermediation around Banking Crisis
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Figure 2. Economic Growth and Financial Intermediation in the Long Run 
Averages for 1960-2000



































         Note: t-statistic between parenthesis using robust OLS.   31
Figure 3. Frequency distributions of short-run coefficients 
for various groupings
(a) No crisis vs. Some crisis
Sample: 66 Countries 1961-2000
(b) Low and medium financial volatility vs. High financial volatility
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Sample of countries
Full Sample (75 
countries)
Restricted Sample (66 
countries)
Algeria x x x
Argentina x x x
Australia x x x
Austria x x x
Bangladesh - - x
Belgium x x x
Bolivia x x x
Botswana - - x
Brazil x x x
Burkina Faso x x x
Canada x x x
Chile x x x
China - - x
Colombia x x x
Congo, Dem. Rep. x - x
Congo, Rep. x x x
Costa Rica - - x
Cote d'Ivoire x x x
Denmark x x x
Dominican Republic x - x
Ecuador x x x
Egypt, Arab Rep. x x x
El Salvador x x x
Finland x x x
France x x x
Gambia, The x x x
Germany - - x
Ghana x - x
Greece x x x
Guatemala x x x
Haiti x x x
Honduras x x x
Iceland x x x
India x x x
Indonesia x x x
Iran, Islamic Rep. x x x
Ireland x x x
Israel x x x
Italy x x x
Jamaica x x x
Japan x x x
Jordan - - x
Kenya x x x
Korea, Rep. x x x
Madagascar x x x
Malawi x x x
Malaysia x x x
Mexico x x x
Morocco x x x
Netherlands x x x
New Zealand x x x
Nicaragua x x x
Niger x x x
Nigeria x x x
Norway x x x
Pakistan x x x
Country
Pooled Mean Group Estimation GMM Estimation (82 
countries)
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Full Sample (75 
countries)
Restricted Sample (66 
countries)
Panama x x x
Papua New Guinea - - x
Paraguay x x x
Peru x x x
Philippines x x x
Portugal x x x
Senegal x - x
Sierra Leone x - x
Singapore x x x
South Africa x x x
Spain x x x
Sri Lanka x x x
Sweden x x x
Switzerland x x x
Syrian Arab Republic x x x
Thailand x - x
Togo x x x
Trinidad and Tobago x x x
Tunisia x x x
Turkey x - x
Uganda x - -
United Kingdom x x x
United States x x x
Uruguay x x x
Venezuela, RB x x x
Zambia x - x
Zimbabwe - - x
Country
Pooled Mean Group Estimation GMM Estimation (82 
countries)
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Appendix 2: Definitions and Sources of Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable Definition and Construction Source
GDP per capita Ratio of total GDP to total 
population. GDP is in 1985 
PPP-adjusted US$. 
Authors' construction using Summers and 
Heston (1991) and The World Bank 
(2002).
GDP per capita growth  Log difference of real GDP 
per capita.
Authors' construction using Summers and 
Heston (1991) and The World Bank 
(2002).
Initial GDP per capita Initial value of ratio of total 
GDP to total population. 
GDP is in 1985 PPP-adjusted 
US$. 
Authors' construction using Summers and 
Heston (1991) and The World Bank 
(2002).
Education Ratio of total secondary 
enrollment, regardless of age, 
to the population of the age 
group that officially 
corresponds to that level of 
education. 
World Development Network (2002) and 
The World Bank (2002).
Private Credit Ratio of domestic credit 
claims on private sector to 
GDP 
Author’s calculations using data from IFS,
the publications of the Central Bank and
PWD. The method of calculations is based
on Beck, Demiguc-Kunt andLevine
(1999).
Trade Openness Residual of a regression of 
the log of the ratio of exports 
and imports (in 1995 US$) to 
GDP (in 1995 US$), on the 
logs of area and population, 
and dummies for oil 
exporting and for landlocked 
countries.
Author’s calculations with data from 
World Development Network (2002) and 
The World Bank (2002).
Government Size Ratio of government 
consumption to GDP.
The World Bank (2002).
CPI Consumer price index (1995 
= 100) at the end of the year
Author’s calculations with data from IFS.
Inflation rate Annual % change in CPI Author’s calculations with data from IFS.
Systemic Banking Crises Number of years in which a
country underwent a
systemic banking crisis, as a
fraction of the number of
years in the corresponding
period.
Author’s calculations using data from
Caprio and Klingebiel (1999), and
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998).
Period-specific Shifts Time dummy variables. Authors’ construction.  
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